Governments have always been keen to achieve 
results, but calls to improve public sector performance 
in OECD  countries have become particularly  loud  and 
insistent over the last couple of decades. 
Reasons  include  increasing  claims  on  public 
expenditure,  particularly  pensions,  healthcare  and 
education,  expectations  of  higher  quality  public 
services in line with rising living standards and, in many 
cases,  reluctance  on  the  part  of  citizens  to  pay  ever 
higher  taxes.  Government  also  has  to  be  more 
competitive  in  the  face of other potential suppliers  in 
areas  like  transport,  communications  and  energy.  It 
must show it can do the job it sets out to do. 
That  is why  governments  across  the OECD  have 
responded by setting goals and shifting  the emphasis of 
government management and budgeting away from how 
much money  to  spend  towards  what  is  actually  being 
achieved. New Zealand was among the first to adopt this 
results‐oriented budgeting and management approach in 
the late 1980s, and was followed in the 1990s by Canada, 
Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Sweden, the UK and 
the US. Later, Austria, Germany and Switzerland launched 
similar  moves,  and  Turkey  has  recently  begun  a  pilot 
phase of this process. 
At  the  same  time,  these  developments  have 
pushed governments to modernise their accountability 
and control procedures.  In particular, over  the  last 15 
years or so, OECD governments have been engaged  in 
reviewing and  reforming  the ways  in which  they keep 
control  over  large  and  complex  operations  in  public 
services  and  how  those  responsible  are  held  to 
account. Technological  innovation  and  changes  in  the 
size  and  structure  of  government,  in  part  reflecting 
privatisation  and decentralisation,  are  also playing  an 
important role in fostering these developments. 
But these initiatives have by no means run their 
course, and their widespread implementation gives rise 
to  some  fundamental  questions.  What  is  meant  by 
performance in the public service context, and how can 
it  best  be measured?  Should  a  service  be  judged  by, 
say, its accessibility or its financial cost, and who should 
do  the  judging?  How  can  moves  to  increase  the 
managerial  responsibilities  and  decision‐making 
powers  of  public  servants  be  reconciled  with 
democratic control and effective auditing procedures? 
It  is  clearly not enough  to argue  that a  reform 
works because  it  is based on sound research, or on an 
accepted  procedure,  or  indeed  that  the  government 
spent  billions  on  its  implementation.  The  main 
challenge  is how  to make  reforms  achieve  their  goal. 
This  is the basic  idea underlying performance‐oriented 
budgeting  and  management:  to  shift  the  emphasis 
away  from  controlling  inputs  and  towards  achieving 
results.  However,  OECD  countries  are  at  different 
stages  in  this  process  and  approaches  to 
implementation vary.
<b>Note:</b> The  Organisation  for  Economic  Co‐
operation  and  Development  (OECD)  is  celebrating  its 
50th anniversary, but its roots go back to the rubble of 
Europe  after World War  II.  Determined  to  avoid  the 
mistakes  of  their  predecessors  in  the wake  of World 
War  I, European  leaders  realised  that  the best way  to 
ensure  lasting  peace  was  to  encourage  co‐operation 
and reconstruction, rather than punish the defeated.

to bring about, or to cause a lot of trouble or damage.

to break down or wear out a person, physically or
mentally.

to reduce to a ruinous state by or as if by violence.

Constantine Michalos, president of the Athens
Chamber of commerce, sat in his office - around
the corner from where protesters were hurling
chunks of marble at riot police - and
contemplated what was once unthinkable: that
Greece would default on its debt and then be
forced into a messy exit from the euro.
All hell would break loose,” Mr Michalos said,
sketching a society that would quickly run short of
fuel, food, medicine and necessities. ”You would
have social upheaval."
Since the crisis began, it has been widely held that
a default would prove disastrous not only for
Greece but also for the entire European Union,
and that it was to be avoided at all costs.
That assumption is being questioned as never
before. Some Officials argue that the blowback
from a Greek default might not be so debilitating,
after all.
“I am not advocating a Greek default, hard or soft
but I'm not excluding the possibility of it if the
Greeks don't get their acts together, Europe is
prepared... I think we've taken the necessary
measures." Alexander Stubb, Finland's Europe
minister, told the Financial Times.
That view is by no means unanimous among
Greece's creditors. François Fillon, French prime
minister, On Friday had a stinging rebuke for those
who would consider it. “To put in play the default
30 of Greece is completely irresponsible," he told
broadcaster RTL.
Stéphane Deo, European economist at UBS,
warned that a Greek default could wreak havoc 
across the continent, including bank runs.
In rumour-prone Athens, business leaders,
politicians and economists are aghast at open
discussion of default. ”It would be a nightmare,"
said Yannis Stournaras, head of the Foundation
for Economic and Industrial Research, an Athens
think-tank. ”You would see serial defaults... Banks
would collapse completely. There would be no
banks.”
An important factor in any default would be the
reaction of the European Central Bank. lt might be
possible to keep Greece in the eurozone and
contain the damage if the ECB were to provide a
Iif_eline to the country's banks, some analysts
beheve.
But it is also possible Frankfurt would decide it
could no longer accept Greek government bonds
as collateral. Without ECB liquidity - cut-off from
financial markets - Athens would have to print
drachmas to pay its bills.
The new currency would plunge in value against
the euro. That would trigger another wave of
defaults for businesses and citizens, unable to pay
outstanding debts in euros. Lítigation, and even
deeper recession, would probably ensue.
Platon Monokroussos, research head at Eurobank
EFG, believes a Greek default might even cascade
into a full-blown EU exit, because government
would probably try to impose capital controls,
close borders and take measures that violated EU
law.
Greece's mainstream politicians appear aware of
this. Lucas Papademos, the prime minister,
warned MPs that the country faced “catastrophe”
if it did not approve a sweeping austerity package
tied to the loan.
Opinion polls show more than 70 per cent of
Greeks determined to remain in the eurozone
despite enduring two years of austerity and
economic contraction.
However, there is a minority - particularly on the
far left - that wants out. Their chief argument,
endorsed by some well-known foreign
economists, is that a devalued drachma would
lower wages and instantly make Greece more
competitive.
They tend to point to Argentina, which broke its
peg with the dollar more than a decade ago,
defaulted on its foreign debt and has since fared
far better than many expected.
Yet that comparison overlooks the fact that the
Greek economy - unlike Argentina's - boasts a
small production base and few exporters. Most of
its companies rely on imports, which would rocket
in cost. Sceptical, too, are ordinary citizens. ..“We
are not Argentina," Mr. Stournaras said. ”We are
not even self-sufficient in agriculture.”

a Canadian post-grunge and alternative rock band.

a non-monotonic logic proposed by Raymond Reiter.

the failure to satisfy the terms of a loan obligation or to
pay back a loan.

the President of the European Central Bank.

a German minister with the European Union.

a city in Germany, seat of the European Central Bank.

a city in Germany, seat of the German Government.

to speak in an angry and critical way to someone.

Questões de Elementos gramaticais